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Summary 
The Central and Eastern European countries significantly reduced their carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions between 1995 and 2003. Was this emission reduction just the fortuitous result of 
the major economic transformation undergone by countries in the transition? Or is it rather a 
result of more stringent environmental policy? The objective of the article is to answer this 
question through a simultaneous equation model of the demand (emissions) and supply 
(environmental stringency) of pollution. The supply equation takes into account the 
institutional quality of the country as well as consumer preferences for environmental quality. 
The results indicate that, all else equal, output growth would have increased industrial CO2 
emissions in the Central and Eastern European countries in our sample by 31% between 1995 
and 2003, and the composition effect corresponded to an increase of 8.4% of emissions. 
Nevertheless, the technique effect, induced by more stringent environmental policy, reduced 
industrial CO2 emissions by 58%, and allowed for a final beneficial result for the 
environment, i.e., -18% of industrial CO2 emissions in 2003 compared to 1995. Finally, our 
study confirms the importance of institutional factors in the explanation and further prediction 
of pollution reduction in transition economies. 
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The Factors Behind CO2 Emission Reduction in Transition Economies  
 
______________________ 
  Introduction 
The disintegration of the Soviet Empire and the changes that took place in Eastern and 
Central Europe by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s revealed the extent of 
the disastrous environmental state of this part of the world. Although these countries differ 
significantly, the centralized planning of economic activity had generated common ecological 
problems: levels of industrial pollution that threaten human health; significant soil and water 
pollution (in particular in the old Soviet Union); a persistent negligence of nuclear safety and 
waste  management  issues,  etc.  The  transition  process  towards  a  market  economy  and 
democracy could have contradictory effects on environmental quality in these countries. At 
first,  the  fall  in  industrial  production  directly  reduced  pollution  levels,  but  the  increased 
economic growth from the mid 1990s may lead to concerns about further deterioration of the 
state  of  the  environment.  The  negative  externality  of  pollution  must  in  some  way  be 
internalized in economic decisions and the role of the State and of its environmental policy is 
crucial.  In  a  democratic  society,  citizens  and  non-governmental  associations  have  the 
possibility of expressing their preferences to government and polluting companies in order to 
reduce pollution and obtain more efficient application of existing regulations. But the Central 
and Eastern European transition countries have quite a short experience of democracy and are 
in the process of building new governmental administration. 
A study of the empirical evidence shows that the transition to a market economy in the 
Eastern and Central European countries was beneficial for the environment, in particular for 
air and water quality. The emissions of the most important air and water pollutants declined 
quickly and drastically in the majority of these countries during the 1990s. Reductions from 
30 to 70% of the emissions of pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, suspended 
particles, BOD, solids and nitrogen were typical during the 1993-2000 period (Bluffstone, 
2006). 
Which were the determining factors behind these observed emission reductions? The 
key factors mentioned in the literature are: 
￿  A  massive  fall  in  aggregate  industrial  output,  the  quasi-disappearance  of  the 
military-industrial  complexes  and  redeployment  of  production  towards  the  less 
polluting service sector;  
￿  An  increase  in  exports  to  Western  Europe  and  the  need  for  compliance  with 
international standards;  
￿  An  expansion  of  the  private  sector  and  reduction  of  State  participation  in 
companies’  property,  that  may  have  stimulated  innovation  and  allowed  an 
improvement of business management;  
￿  An increase in foreign investments with their important technological externalities 
necessary  for  the  modernization  of  production  technologies  and  economic 
effectiveness;  
￿  A better application of environmental policy;  
￿  Intensification of public participation in decision-making and better functioning of 
the civil society, increased democratization. 
Some of these factors may work both ways, which has caused some controversy as to 
their role: foreign direct investments (FDI) may concentrate in pollution-intensive sectors, for 
example. The interest in studying the case of transition countries is that they have undergone  
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rapid and profound change in several of the determinants of pollution, such as economic 
growth, trade openness and environmental regulation. 
  Current research defines three variables or channels of influence that can determine 
the total economic impact of growth on the environment. 
￿  The first is the scale of economic activity. For physical reasons, all things equal, 
more  production  means  more  pollution.  But  other  things  are  not  usually  equal.  An 
improvement of technology, for example, is likely to attenuate this relation.  
￿  The second is the structure / composition of economic activity. Economic growth 
(and/or international trade) can move production from one sector to another (for example 
between the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors). As the environmental damage 
per manufacturing unit varies according to the sector, the effect of growth or trade on the total 
pollution can change.  
￿  The third is the production techniques. The same product can be manufactured by 
using a variety of rather different techniques, some "cleaner" than others. Depending on the 
use  of  more  or  less  environmentally-friendly  techniques,  pollution  per  unit  of  GDP  may 
decrease or increase. 
The  relation  between  GDP  and  environmental  quality  is  not  straightforward.  It  is 
seldom monotonous: sometimes the economic growth of a country is initially harmful for the 
environment and becomes beneficial later. The explanation lies in the three conflicting forces 
mentioned above. When GDP increases, the larger scale of production leads directly to more 
pollution  and  more  environmental  damage.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
favourable  changes  in  the  economic  structure  and  production  techniques.  The  question  is 
whether the last two effects can compensate the first one. In section 2 we present some studies 
that have analyzed the empirical results related to this question (see also Dean [1992] and 
[2002], for a more detailed review of the literature). This aspect is important for transition 
countries since the strong economic growth during the last ten years may lead to increased 
pollution  and  maybe  even  a  return  to  pre-1990  emission  levels.  Is  it  possible  that  the 
composition and technique effects will compensate the scale effect and stabilize emissions at 
acceptable levels for sustainable environmental quality? 
The potential factors that contribute to environmental quality in transition countries 
may  be  grouped  into  two  categories:  the  evolution  of  the  economy  (economic  growth, 
changes  in  the  economic  and  industrial  structure)  on  the  one  hand,  and  changes  in 
environmental regulation due to progress in democracy, on the other hand. The contribution 
of the article lies in the empirical estimation of these factors on industrial emissions of carbon 
dioxide  (CO2)  in  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  transition  countries.  We  estimate  a 
simultaneous equation model of the demand and supply of pollution in order to distinguish the 
effects  of  economic  factors  versus  the  stringency  of  environmental  regulation.  The 
environmental policy is determined in its turn by consumer preferences for environmental 
quality and by institutional factors such as corruption and political instability. 
For our specification of the demand for pollution we follow Antweiler, Copeland and 
Taylor  [2001]  but  extend  the  basic  model  to  include  a  more  detailed  composition  effect. 
Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor [2001] consider one aggregate polluting sector, but in the 
case of transition countries, there was not only a change in the share of the manufacturing 
industry in the economy, but also important shifts within the manufacturing industry itself.  
In order to account for the complex relationship between environmental quality and 
environmental  policy,  and  possible  endogeneity  problems,  we  specifically  need  to  model 
environmental policy formation. Given the prevalence of corruption and political instability in 
transition countries, we use the theoretical approach proposed by Fredriksson and Svensson 
[2003] to model the supply of pollution.   
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As  for  the  empirical  method,  we  use  the  two or  three-stage  least  squares  method, 
according to specification tests, in order to correct for any bias between variables in the same 
equation and between equations. We test the model over the period 1995-2003 on a sample of 
60  heterogeneous  countries  from  three  different  groups:  Central  and  Eastern  European 
transition economies, emerging economies, and industrialized economies. We compiled quite 
a  rich  dataset  for  this  purpose,  covering  statistics  on  emissions,  corruption,  political 
instability, democratization, value added of different industrial sub-sectors, etc. We also use 
the dataset to develop a compact index of the stringency of environmental policy that enables 
us to compare environmental policy in the sample across countries and time. 
Our empirical results show that industrial CO2 emissions in the Central and Eastern 
European transition countries would have increased by 31% during 1995-2003 simply as a 
result of an economic scale effect. The composition effect, that represents a restructuring 
among the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry, would have explained an 8.4% increase 
in pollution, whereas the technique effect had the largest marginal impact and corresponded to 
a 58% decrease in emissions.
2 In robustness tests, we also find a significant effect of trade 
openness:  it  increases  industrial  CO2  emissions  in  transition  countries,  but  this  effect  is 
reduced with increased capital accumulation. Finally, our analysis highlights the importance 
of institutional factors in explaining the emission reduction in transition countries, rather than 
factors related solely to economic restructuring as such (scale and composition effects).  
The paper consists of six sections. In the first section we review the relevant literature 
and in the second section, we present some stylized facts on industrial CO2 emissions. In the 
third section we develop a theoretical model that identifies the factors behind environmental 
quality  in  transition  countries  and  enables  us  to  specify  the  empirical  relations.  The 
econometric specification and a description of the data follow in the fourth section. The fifth 
section analyzes the empirical results and compares them with the results of other studies. The 
last section concludes.  
 
1  Review of the literature 
By now, several cross-country and time series studies have allowed researchers to 
generalize some results concerning the three conflicting effects of economic growth on the 
environment. For certain environmental quality measures, an inverted U-shaped relationship 
appears: in the case of low per capita income levels, pollution is generally low; above these 
levels, additional economic growth leads to an increasingly intense pollution until per capita 
income stabilizes on an intermediate level, above which any further economic growth results 
in an improvement of environmental quality; in the case of high per capita income, pollution 
is  relatively  limited.  This  empirical  relationship  is  known  under  the  name  of  the 
Environmental  Kuznets  Curve  (EKC)  following  Grossman  and  Krueger’s  cross-country 
analyses  [1993,  1995]  on  urban  air  pollution  (sulphur  dioxide  emissions  and  smoke)  and 
several measures of water pollution. Several studies later confirmed this kind of relationship 
(Selden  and  Song  [1994],  Hilton  and  Levinson  [1998],  Bradford,  Schlieckert  and  Shore 
[2000], Bimonte [2001], Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson [2000]), although the existence of 
an EKC curve is sensitive to functional form and data updating, for example. 
The idea behind the EKC is that economic growth is bad for the quality of air and 
water during the initial stages of industrialization, but later, once the country becomes rich 
enough  to  pay  for  the  quality  of  its  environment,  growth  contributes  to  the  reduction  of 
pollution. The dominant theoretical explanation is that the technology of production makes a 
certain level of pollution inevitable, but that the demand for environmental quality increases 
                                                 
2 A summary of the results is presented in Table 4, page 24.  
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with income. A necessary condition for this demand to be satisfied is the existence of civil 
freedoms. Hence, in a country with a political regime of dictatorship, as the capacity of the 
population to express their opinions to put pressure on the government is very weak, a growth 
of the net per capita income does not necessarily result in a reduction of pollution, despite 
increased preferences for environmental quality. In a democratic society, by contrast, at high 
levels of per capita income, the public demand for environmental quality increases and leads 
to more stringent environmental regulation.
3 
Concerning the relation between trade openness and environmental quality, Eiras and 
Schaeffer [2001] show that the average index of sustainability
4 in open economies is at least 
30% higher than the index in countries with a moderately open economy and almost double 
the level of the index in a closed economy. A casual inspection of data may lead to the 
conclusion that trade is good for the environment. Several studies have tried to isolate the 
independent effect of trade openness using a variety of methods on different samples (Lucas, 
Wheeler and Hettige [1992], Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson [2000], Dean [2002], Copeland 
and Taylor [2001, 2004], Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor [2001], Frankel and Rose [2005]). 
Almost all find a rather positive relation between trade openness and environmental quality. 
Nevertheless, none of these studies considers the possible endogeneity of the relation between 
international trade and the environment: trade may be the result of environmental endowment, 
rather than the cause. 
Studies  in  the  field  of  environmental  regulation  often  argue  that  the  presence  of 
corruption, political instability and absence of democracy induce socially sub-optimal effects 
of governmental policy. Empirical studies on the effects of political instability (Alesina and 
Perotti  [1996],  Alesina  et  al.  [1996],  Svensson  [1998]),  of  corruption  (Lopez  and  Mitra 
[2000],  Fredriksson  and  Svensson  [2003],  Damania,  Fredriksson  and  List  [2003,  2004], 
Welsch [2003], Damania, Fredriksson and Mani [2004], Pelligrini and Gerlagh [2005]) and of 
the  absence  of  democracy  (Fredriksson  et  al.  [2005]  and  Pelligrini  and  Gerlagh  [2005]) 
confirm this hypothesis. Söderholm [2001] adds that the suggested policy already assumes the 
existence of an effectively operating institutional structure. Analyzing the Russian case, he 
identifies and discusses several reasons of why it may be difficult to implement an effective 
system of pollution taxes in an economy where the old legal and behavioural models are still 
present.  He  concludes  that  it  is  probably  more  suitable  to  consider  the  environmental 
problems in the transition economies not as market imperfections, but rather as a result of the 
institutional inertia in the economic and political systems. Pellegrini and Gerlagh [2005] find 
a very important negative and statistically significant impact of corruption on environmental 
policies,  while  democracy  has  a  very  limited  positive  impact.  Consequently,  the  authors 
suggest that a reduction of the corruption level would induce higher growth rates and stricter 
environmental policies.  
Among  the  studies  that  analyze  the  joint  effects  of  several  determinants  of 
environmental policy, Fredriksson and Svensson [2003] were the first to analyze the common 
effects of political instability  and corruption on policy creation. They  found that political 
                                                 
3  Another possible explanation  for the  EKC  is that it  is formed  naturally  via the  composition  of 
production. In theory, the model could result from the usual phases of economic development: the 
transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial one and then from industry to services, the last 
tending to produce less pollution than industry (see Arrow et al. [1995]).  
 
4 The Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network, in collaboration with the World Economic Forum and the Joint Research Centre 
of the European Commission, publish annually a ranking of countries using a composite index – the 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) or, since 2008, the Environmental Performance Index (EPI).  
The data is available on http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI.  
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instability  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  stringency  of  environmental  regulation  when  the 
corruption level is low, but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high. Corruption 
reduces the stringency of the policy, but this effect disappears with an increase of political 
instability. Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson [2006] interact the environmental effect of corruption 
with the one of foreign direct investments (FDI). They find that when the corruption level is 
very important (negligible), FDI induce less (more) stringent environmental policy. Damania, 
Fredriksson and List [2003] analyze the joint effect of trade openness and corruption on the 
stringency  of  environmental  policy.  According  to  their  empirical  results,  trade  openness 
increases the stringency of environmental policy, while corruption reduces it. The effects of 
the  two  variables  are  interdependent.  Trade  openness  has  a  more  important  impact  on 
environmental policy in countries with more corrupt governments. Moreover, a reduction of 
corruption has a greater effect on policy in a closed economy.   
2  Some stylized facts 
For reasons of data availability and compatibility, our database covers 60 countries 
over the period 1995-2003, including 14 transition economies, 19 emerging economies, and 
27 industrialized economies (see the list of countries in the Appendix). Among the industrial 
air pollutants we chose carbon dioxide (CO2) because of its international importance (the 
Kyoto  Protocol)  and  because  of  the  availability  of  annual  emissions  data  from  the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). CO2 emissions originate primarily from three sources: 
residential heating, industry and transport. We chose to study industrial CO2 emissions, which 
still constitute a large part of total CO2 emissions in transition economies. 
Transition economies have all gone through two phases of economic activity over the 
period of the sample: a deep transitional recession, followed by a period of economic recovery 
and rapid growth, that adds up to an increase in GDP per capita of 13% in 2003 compared to 
1990 (Figure 1). The first period of transition, between 1990 and 1993, naturally led to a large 
reduction in CO2 emissions. In the ten years that followed, industrial CO2 emissions increased 
somewhat, then stabilized and even decreased in per capita levels (Figure 2). There is thus a 
tendency  of  progressive  convergence  towards  the  indicators  of  industrialized  countries  or 
emerging economies.  
 
Sources: CO2 emissions data – IEA; GDP per capita – World Bank 
Still,  industrial  CO2  emissions  in  terms  of  emissions  per  GDP  or  per  USD  of 
manufacturing production remain much higher than the levels in industrialized economies 
(Figures 3 and 4).    
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Sources: CO2 emissions data– IEA; GDP – World Bank;   
Manufacturing industry data – UNIDO 
Is the positive evolution of CO2 emissions per USD of GDP (or USD of manufacturing 
production)  an  indicator  of  increased  production  efficiency  or  is  it  rather  the  result  of 
structural change in the economy? World Bank data shows a small decrease in the share of 
industry in GDP and some growth in the service sector (that represents 60% of GDP on 
average  in  2000).  Nevertheless,  other  factors  may  have  played  an  important  role: 
modernization  of  production  technology  due  to  a  more  stringent  environmental  policy  or 
better  corporate  management,  increased  trade  openness  requiring  compliance  with 
international standards, or yet changes within the manufacturing sector itself. The UNIDO 
data  on  the  manufacturing  industry  suggest  that  the  development  of  some  industrial  sub-
sectors (Food, Machinery and equipment, Wood products, Chemicals, and Iron & steel and 
basic metal products) seem to have contributed to a certain extent to the reduction in industrial 
CO2 emissions. In parallel, Figure 5 shows a strong increase in trade openness. At the same 
time, being worse ranked than the other countries in terms of the stringency of environmental 
policy
5 at the beginning of the transition process, the countries in transition experienced an 
improvement in this index between 1995 and 2003 (Figure 6).  
 
Sources: Trade openness data – World Bank; 
 Stringency of Environmental Policy Index – created by the authors. 
These stylized facts suggest that it is relevant to study the  relative  weights of the 
different  potential  factors  behind  the  reduction  in  industrial  CO2  emissions  in  transition 
countries. The following analysis is devoted to that task, first by constructing a theoretical 
model including the above mentioned factors, and then by testing it on available data to assess 
the individual impact of the causal factors. 
 
                                                 
5 Index created by the authors (for details on its calculation see Section 4).  
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3  Theoretical Model 
We model a small open economy composed of a non-polluting sector that produces a 
good  Y , used as a numeraire, and  n polluting (industrial) sectors that produce goods  i X , 
[ ] n i , 1 Î   with  a  constant  returns  to  scale  technology.  By  assuming  that  the  representative 
consumer’s utility is separable in consumption goods and disutility from aggregate pollution, 
the demand function for each good is   ( )
i i i X X X p d c =  with  0 ' <
i X d . The consumer surplus 
can then be defined as: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ∑ ∑ - =
i i i i i i X X X X X X p d p p d u S              (1) 
 
where 
i X u (increasing  and  concave  in 
i X c )  are  derived  from  the  initial  utility  function 
( ) E c u c U
i X i Y h - + = ∑  ;  Y c  and 
i X c are the consumption of the numeraire and of goods  i X ; 
E  is aggregate pollution and h measures the consumer’s valuation of a unit of environmental 
damage (assumed constant here).  
Let  us  now  study  the  behaviour  of  a  representative  firm  in  sector  i.  Pollution  is 
generated by the production of goods i x . The firm has access to an abatement technology. 
Following Antweiler, Copeland et Taylor [2001], if a firm has a total production of  i x  units 
and allocates  ai x  units to reduce pollution,  i ai i x x h =  represents the abatement effort of the 
representative firm in sector i. Due to different production technologies in the sectors i and 
thus different amounts of  ai x  necessary to reduce polluting emissions by one unit, firms in 
different  manufacturing  sub-sectors,  though  subject  to  the  same  environmental  regulation, 
will have different degrees of abatement. Pollution per manufacturing unit in sector i, which 
is the same for all the firms in the sector, can be written as a function of the abatement effort : 
( ) i i i h q q = ,  with  0 < h q   and  0 > hh q   corresponding  to  decreasing  returns  to  scale  in 
abatement.  
We model the stringency of environmental policy by means of a unit emission tax on 
pollution, t.
6 The profits of a firm equal its gross revenues less deduction of factor payments, 
pollution  taxes  and  abatement  costs.  Using  the  definition  of  i h ,  the  profits  of  the 
representative firm in sector  i (before the payment of any bribe) can be written 
 
( ) (1 ) i i i i i i i p h c h x p tq = - - -                                                                                        (2) 
 
where  i p  denotes profits,  i c  the marginal costs of production factors in sector i, assumed 
constant, and  i p  the output price of the good of sector i.  
Under the (simplifying) hypothesis of constant returns to scale, the production level is 
indeterminate. Since the objective here is to determine the effect of the stringency of the 
                                                 
6  In  reality,  there  are  several  fiscal  and  regulatory  actions  imposed  on  polluting  production  that 
generate a cost for the firm while not necessarily generating budget revenue for the government. We 
use an emission tax as a stylized means of capturing the stringency of environmental regulation in a 
simple manner.  
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environmental regulation on pollution, the level of abatement effort,  i h , is the key variable. 
The first-order condition for the abatement effort compares the marginal cost of reducing 
pollution with its marginal benefit (a reduction in the tax payment):  
                 ( ) i i i p h tq¢ = -                                                                             (3) 
which implies  ( ) i i i h h p t =  with  0 ht >  and thus  ( ) i i i p q q t =  with  0 t q < .        (4)                     
To conclude, an increase in the emission tax leads to an increase in the abatement 
effort  and  a  reduction  in  pollution  per  unit  of  production.  Aggregate  pollution  E   equals 
∑ i i i X p ) / (t q . 
Government and pollution supply  
The  importance  of  institutional  characteristics  such  as  corruption  and  political 
instability  in  transition  countries  calls  for  modelling  the  creation  of  environmental  policy 
following the approach proposed by Fredriksson and Svensson [2003] with the added features 
of a disaggregated polluting sector with constant returns to scale in each sub-sector, and the 
incorporation of consumer preferences for environmental quality.  
The stringency of environmental policy is represented by the level of the emission tax 
on pollution. Total tax revenues equal:  
∑ = = i i i X p E T ) / (t q t t                                                                                            (5) 
Tax revenues are supposed to be redistributed to all individuals in an equal manner. 
Gross profits of polluting sector i,  i P , is thus a function of environmental policy as modelled 
through the level of the emission tax t ,  ( ) i t P . The polluting sectors  i are assumed to be 
able to organize themselves into a lobby to negotiate a less stringent environmental policy (a 
lower emission tax) in return for a bribe to the incumbent government.  The model is thus 
defined by a three-stage game between the incumbent government and the industrial lobby. 
First,  the  lobby  offers  the  government  a  prospective  bribe  as  a  function  of  the  tax  level, 
denoted ( ) B t . The lobby takes into account political instability and the corruptibility of the 
incumbent  government  when  making  its  bribe  offer.  In  the  second  stage,  the  incumbent 
government decides on its optimal environmental policy, given the lobby’s strategy. In the 
third stage, the environmental policy is implemented, given that the incumbent government 
stays in power. Once the emission tax has been announced, firms determine their production 
and abatement efforts.  
The expected utility of the lobby (before any bribe payment) is given by: 
            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
p
L i i W t l d t l d t = - - P + - P    ∑ ∑                                                (6)  
where  l  is the probability that the incumbent government will be thrown out of office; d  is 
the  probability  that  the  new  government  applies  the  same  environmental  policy  as  its 
predecessor; 
p t  is the new, exogenous, tax level if the new government does not follow its 
predecessor’s policy.  
The incumbent government’s objective function consists of a weighted average of the 
bribe and aggregate social welfare, denoted WT : 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 T G B a W t t l t º + -                                                                                    (7)  
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The parameter  a measures the exogenous weight accorded by government to social welfare 
relative to the bribe. A high value of the parameter  a signifies a government that is less 
sensitive to corruption. 
  Following the Common Agency model by Bernheim and Whinston [1986], extended 
by Grossman and Helpman [1994] and by Dixit, Grossman and Helpman [1997], the political 
equilibrium maximizes the joint surplus of all parties. The equilibrium tax t
* maximizes the 
sum  of  the  lobby’s  utility  and  the  government’s  objective  function.  In  order  to  find  the 
equilibrium tax t
*, we thus have to solve 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0
L T W W
a t l t
t t
* * ¶ ¶
+ - =
¶ ¶
 .                                                                             (8) 
  Social  welfare  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  total  profits,  consumer  surplus,  and  tax 
revenues, less the disutility suffered from aggregate pollution: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) T i i i i i i i W S p X p X t t tq t h q t = P + + - ∑ ∑ ∑                                        (9) 
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Substituting Equations (10) and (11) into (8), we obtain  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
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*   ¶
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∑ ∑         (12) 
In order to satisfy the equality, given that the first term is negative (see Equations (3) 
and (4)), the second term has to be positive. Thus, t h
* < , implying a sub-optimal emissions 
tax.  By  rearranging  Equation  (12),  we  obtain  an  implicit  expression  for  the  equilibrium 
environmental policy:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
The absolute level of emissions
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The change in emissions following 
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64 4 744 8
144 4 2444 3
                                                       (13) 
For  a  socially  optimal  policy,  the  Pigovian  tax  applies  and  t h
* = .  This  is  only 
possible in the absence of corruption and political instability. In order for the emission tax t
* 
to approach h, the denominator has to be as large as possible. The higher the level of  a (a 
government that is less sensitive to corruption), the smaller the level of political instability l  
and  the  stronger  the  reaction  by  firms  (by  changing  production  techniques)  following  an 
increase in the emission tax, the closer the emission tax will be to the socially optimal level.  
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Pollution demand 
Define Q – the value of total production in the economy (the scale of the economy);  i V  
- the value of production in sector i,  i i i p X V =  ;  Q Vi ∑ = j  - the weight of the aggregate 
polluting sector in the value of total production, and  ∑ = i i i V V g  - the weight of each sub-
sector i in the total value of the polluting sectors. We can then decompose pollution as: 
∑ ∑ ∑ = = = i i i
i
i
i i i p Q
p
V
X E / q g j q q .                  (14) 
Equation (14) shows that pollution depends on the scale of the economy, the share of 
the  aggregate  manufacturing  industry  in  the  economy,  and  on  the  relative  weights  of  the 
different sub-sectors, characterized by different pollution intensities. In its differential form, 








+ + = ∑ i i i p Q E q g j ˆ ˆ ˆ                                                                                        (15) 
where « hats » represent percentage changes.  
Given the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, standard profit maximization does 
not allow us to determine the firm’s production. As we are in a partial equilibrium framework, 
we thus cannot determine the effect of the tax on the economic structure as such. The possible 
bias  resulting  from  this  simplification  implies  an  under-estimation  of  the  impact  of 
environmental policy on pollution. We thus focus on the direct effect of the tax on pollution 











t q e  is the elasticity in emissions per unit of production ( i q ) with respect to a 
change in the real emission tax.                       
  In order to focus on the variables of interest here, such as the value of total production 
Q, the share of the aggregate manufacturing industry j , the relative shares of each sub-sector 
i g  and the stringency of environmental policy, as represented by the level of the emission tax 
t , we rewrite Equation (15): 
( ) , , ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ˆ ˆ ˆ











           (17) 
A change in aggregate emissions can thus be explained by a change in the scale of the 
economy, by a change in the aggregate share of the polluting manufacturing sector in the 
economy,  by  changes  in  the  relative  shares  of  each  manufacturing  sub-sector,  and  by  a 
technique effect following a change in the stringency of the environmental policy, represented 
here by the real value of the emission tax.  
We  conclude  the  model  by  presenting  the  two  equations  of  pollution  supply  and 
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                                                        (18) 
  These two equations need to be estimated simultaneously in order to control for bias 
due  to  endogeneity,  since  pollution  supply  is  influenced  by  current  and  past  levels  of 
pollution, whereas pollution demand is a function of the stringency of environmental policy. 
This is the subject of Section 4 and 5. 
4  Econometric model and data 
    Econometric specification 
Our theoretical model implies a system of two simultaneous equations and identifies 
the main determinants of the variables we seek to explain: the stringency of environmental 
policy and industrial air pollution.  
After  several  preliminary  tests  with  different  functional  forms  and  following  the 
results obtained by the Jarque-Bera test for each one of those, we retain the log-log functional 
form, since, in our case, it ensures normally distributed residuals. This functional form also 
eliminates  any  problem  with  non-linearity  in  the  relation  between  the  dependent  and  the 
explanatory variables. The two econometric equations defined by Equation (13) and Equation 
(17) can then be presented as follows:  
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                                                                              (19) 
where  j  and t are respectively the country and year indices;  E  represents industrial 
CO2 emissions and t  - the emission tax, that here is a modeling tool for the stringency of 
environmental policy and for the identification of the determining factors of environmental 
policy. Due to lack of available data on a comparable tax across countries, we construct our 
own index for the stringency of environmental policy (SEP) that represents an implicit level 
of an emission tax. This index is assumed to have the same impact on environmental quality 
as the stylized emission tax in the theoretical model. Actually, in many developing countries a 
high  level  of  an  emission  tax  does  not  imply  a  high  stringency  of  actual  policy  since 
inspection  and  enforcement  policies  may  be  weak.  In  addition,  using  an  index  of  the 
stringency of environmental policy enables us to include a larger sample of countries that do 
not use environmental taxes.  1 b  and  2 b  are vectors of elasticity coefficients to be estimated 
(since the variables in  1 X¢ and  2 X¢  are in natural logarithms);  jt , 1 e  and  jt , 2 e  are error terms, 
) , 0 ( . . . ~
2
jt N d i i s e . 
The selected explanatory variables are:  1 X¢= {polluting emissions of the current year, 
polluting emissions of year t-1 (the variable CO2_var t-1)
7, net per capita income of the previous 
                                                 
7  The  theoretical  model  predicts  that  environmental  policy  depends  simultaneously  on  current 
emissions and their variation with respect to a change in the stringency of environmental policy. After 
testing several regressions for years t-1 up to t-5, we cannot determine a lag for which the effect is 
significant, but the effects of the other explanatory variables remain robust. Nevertheless we retain the 
variable CO2_var t-1 in order to control for the effects of all the variables suggested by the theoretical 
model.  
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year, political instability, and corruption} and  2 X¢ = {GDP in constant prices, the share of the 
manufacturing industry in the total economy, the relative shares of each industrial sub-sector, 
and the stringency of environmental policy}. Consumer preferences are not observable and 
proxied in our study by net per capita income. The higher is the net revenue, the higher is the 
willingness to pay for environmental quality. This variable is lagged by one year because of 
an inertia specific to policy creation and in order to avoid simultaneity problems (see the Wu-
Hausman test in Table 1 in Section 5). 
Data 
In order to test the predictions of the theoretical model, we need data on industrial air 
emissions, evolution of the economic and industrial structure in the countries studied, the 
stringency of environmental policy, corruption, political instability, consumers’ preferences 
for  environmental  quality  (here  represented  by  net  per  capita  income),  and  other  control 
variables. Here we describe the main variables, starting with the dependent variables (see the 
Appendix for definitions, sources and descriptive statistics of all the variables).  
The IEA provides annual data on CO2 emissions (variables CO2 and CO2_var t-1) for 
all countries in transition during the period 1990-2003, separating industrial emissions from 
the  total  emissions.  This  enables  us  to  analyze  industrial  air  pollution  and  to  identify  its 
determining factors.  
The  stringency  of  environmental  policy  (SEP)  is  the  most  difficult  variable  to 
measure since comparable data do not exist for all countries in the world and over time. 
Among the most used proxies one could quote: acceptable maximum lead contents in gasoline 
(data elaborated by Octel company in "Worldwide Gasoline Survey" and available only until 
1995; see Hilton and Levinson [1998] for a detailed presentation of these data, used in a great 
number  of  studies:  Damania,  Fredriksson  and  List  [2003]  for  example),  number  of 
environmental agreements signed by a country, etc. An interesting index used by Damania, 
Fredriksson and Mani (2004) is the one elaborated by the World Economic Forum, resulting 
from a questionnaire addressed to approximately 2000 businessmen of about sixty countries 
who evaluated the stringency of the environmental regulation in their country. We cannot use 
this index in our study, because it is available only beginning with the year 2001. In the 
literature on environmental policy creation one often encounters another index, created by 
Dasgupta et al. [1995] that evaluate the environmental policy in the agricultural sector of 31 
countries for the year 1990, using a quantified analysis of reports prepared for the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development. This index was recomputed by Eliste 
and  Fredriksson  [2002]  for  60  countries,  using  the  same  methodology  as  Dasgupta  et  al. 
[1995].  Here  though,  we  wish  to  study  the  impact  of  environmental  policy  on  industrial 
emissions. Moreover, we need a time series of data, whereas the index of Dasgupta et al. 
[1995] gives only a one year cross-country analysis. Another recently created index is the one 
of Cagatay and Mihci [2003], called Environmental Sensitivity Performance Index (ESPI), 
which is built on the basis of OECD’s pressure, state and response indicators
8. The advantage 
of this index is to take into account all environmental media (air pollution, water, waste, etc.) 
and to provide a general framework of the stringency of the environmental policy. However, 
since it is based on estimated variables rather than observed data, and based on the relative 
degree of pollution produced by certain industrial activities and the efforts of the economic 
agents to improve environmental quality, this index does not seem to take well into account 
the effort of government itself. By consequence, being an effect of pollution rather than its 
                                                 
8 In this context, pressure indicators are used to determine the sources of various factors implying 
negative  environmental  changes,  whereas  state  indicators  are  used  to  measure  the  environmental 
quality.  The  response  indicators  measure  the  efforts  of  certain  economic  agents  to  improve 
environmental quality and/or to protect the environment against various pollution sources.  
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determinant, the ESPI is not appropriate for our study, because of the impossibility to observe 
and analyze properly the factors of environmental policy creation. Thus we have no choice 
but to create our own index by using various proxies that evaluate directly or indirectly the 
stringency of environmental policy, resulting from government’s effort and interest.  
We calculate an index that classifies each country according to the stringency of its 
environmental  policy.  Our  theoretical  model  suggests  that  the  policy  established  by  the 
government  is  the  result  of  the  joint  welfare  maximization  of  all  actors  in  society:  firms 
organized in lobbies in order to influence the government and actors in general which are 
represented  by  firms/people  seeking  to  maximize  their  profits/utility  according  to  their 
preferences.  The  government’s  decisions  are  influenced  by  the  actions  of  these  groups 
confronted themselves with the politicians’ own interests. In this context, we created the SEP 
index that comprises at the same time variables of environmental policy and of industry’s and 
the population’s capacity to organize in lobbies (nongovernmental organizations, etc.) in order 
to put pressure on government’s behavior towards a more environmentally-friendly direction. 
The more society demands environmental quality, the more one expects a stringent policy. 
We chose the following variables for the calculation of this index: 
￿  Number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) signed by a country. As 
MEAs become increasingly strict and demanding, compliance with these agreements requires 
a more stringent domestic policy. Given pressure from the international organizations charged 
with observing compliance, one could assume that the fact of having signed an MEA would 
signal a government’s willingness to harmonize its environmental policy with international 
standards in order to make it more effective. 
￿  Existence of a regulation on air pollution (ECOLEX database of UNEP). We do 
not consider the absolute number of laws and regulations, because that could bias our results 
in favour of countries with many laws but that are not always applied or effective. For this 
reason, the variable takes value 1 if the country has air pollution regulations and 0 otherwise.  
￿  Density of international nongovernmental organizations (NGO), represented by the 
number of NGO members by million inhabitants. NGOs play a considerable role in shaping 
and applying participative democracy. They take part in mechanisms or procedures instituted 
at national level in order to implement the Agenda 21 program, by using their particular 
capacities in the fields of education, poverty prevention, protection and improvement of the 
environment. 
￿ Number of ISO 14001 certified companies, weighted by GDP. 
￿ Adhesion to the Responsible Care® Program, a unilateral voluntary initiative of 
the chemical industry within the framework of which the companies, represented by national 
associations, work together in order to improve their safety and environmental performances 
and to communicate with stakeholders about their products and manufacturing process. The 
program is currently applied as broadly as possible within the chemical and allied industries, 
and through all the supply chain.
9 
                                                 
9 In our analysis, this variable takes the value 2 for countries that adhere to the Responsible Care® 
Program, 1 for countries that do not adhere and that do not have or have only a modest chemical 
industry  (<=5%  of  total  industry,  minimal  value  recorded  by  a  country  having  adhered  to  the 
Program), 0 for countries that do not adhere and that have a more important chemical industry (>5% in 
the total industry), in order to account for different industrial structure across countries. 
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We calculate the SEP index for the period 1995-2003 based on these variables by 
using  the  Z-score  technique
10  that  yields  a  classification  of  countries  according  to  the 
stringency of their environmental policy. 
As for corruption, we use the opposite of the Corruption Control index developed by 
Kaufmann,  Kraay  and  Mastruzzi  [2005].  This  index  measures  the  extent  to  which 
governments  fight  corruption  and  it  takes  values  ranging  between  -2.5  and  +2.5,  the 
maximum values signifying less corruption. The change of sign that we do thus yields an 
indicator  that  varies  directly  with  the  degree  of  corruption  of  the  country.  For  political 
instability  (the  variable  Instab),  we  use  the  opposite  of  the  Political  Stability  index  by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi [2005], similarly to the procedure for the previous variable. 
The  Political  Stability  index  measures  the  probability  that  the  government  in  power  is 
destabilized or replaced. To take into account democracy in the model, we introduce into a 
robustness test a dummy variable FREE that takes the value 1 if the country is characterized 
by important civil liberties and political rights. This variable is taken from the Freedom House 
database. 
For  data  on  industrial  structure  we  have  used  UNIDO’s  INDSTAT4  (REV3) 
database and the value added of nine manufacturing sectors (on an ISIC three-digit level) and 
we have calculated their weights in total manufacturing production. 
All other variables, such as GDP, net per capita income, and trade openness, are from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005.  
Our database is an unbalanced panel
11 of 60 countries, limited to the 1995-2003 period 
for reasons of data availability. It contains 14 transition economies, 19 emerging economies 
and 27 industrialized economies (see the Appendix). 
To conclude, Table 3 in the Appendix shows the correlations between the variables,  
that correspond overall with the predictions of the theoretical model.  
5  Estimation results 
The empirical results confirm the predictions of the theoretical model and they are 
robust with regard to alternative specifications taking into account additional variables that 
may influence the dependent variables and/or interact with the explanatory variables.  
We start by analyzing the empirical results presented in Table 1. This table presents 
the estimation results using the method of two-stage least squares. We find a positive and 
significant effect on CO2 emissions of GDP, the weight of the manufacturing industry in the 
total economy and the shares of the different sub-sectors, apart from the Paper Products sub-
sector, that have the opposite effect. The shares of Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Other 
Manufacturing Products have no significant impact on CO2 emissions (Model (1)). The scale 
effect  appears  to  be  more  important  in  the  transition  economies  and  weaker  in  the 
                                                 
10 In order to test the robustness of the SEP index we also calculated it using two alternative methods: 
factor  analysis  and  principal  component  analysis.  The  indices  calculated  with  these  alternative 
methods are very strongly correlated with the index calculated by using the method of Z-score. The 
results of the regressions using the SEP index calculated with alternative methods are available from 
the authors upon request. 
 
11 The model has been tested for different samples of countries and the results are similar. The panel is 
unbalanced because of missing data in the INDSTAT4 database that do not seem to be linked to 
country characteristics that may be correlated with the variables in our model; for example, there are 
countries with a high degree of corruption that have no missing data, whereas there are missing data 
points for countries with a low level of corruption (mainly due to the choice of classification REV2 or 
REV3 by different countries and industries).  
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industrialized and emerging economies (Model (2)). That could be explained either by the 
different weights of strongly polluting sectors in the total production, or by differences in 
production techniques. The technique effect is represented by the responsiveness to a change 
in  the  stringency  of  environmental  regulation  (SEP  index),  that  usually  translates  into  a 
modernization  of  technology  and  an  improvement  of  the  production  techniques.  Like 
Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor [2001], we find, somewhat surprisingly, that this effect is 
always  very  important,  significantly  negative,  and  larger  than  both  the  scale  and  the 
composition effects. The particular contribution of our study is to test these three effects for 
different groups of countries, and we find that the stringency of the environmental policy has 
a more important marginal impact on pollution in the transition economies (the reference 
group) in our sample. The technique effect is more modest in the emerging economies (Em in 
the table), and its marginal effect is the smallest in the industrialized economies (Ind in the 
table). 
As for the stringency of environmental policy, it is positively affected by consumer 
preferences for environmental quality, as represented by the net per capita income of the 
previous  year. The impact of political instability  and corruption are significantly negative 
(Model  (1)  in  Table  1),  as  predicted  by  the  theoretical  model.  Political  instability  and 
corruption have a very important negative effect on the stringency of environmental policy in 
the transition and emerging economies
12, but have a rather weak impact on the industrialized 
economies in our sample (Model (2)). Pelligrini and Gerlagh [2005] also found a significant 
and very important negative impact of corruption on environmental policy and conclude that 
institutional  disorder  prevents  the  economies  in  transition  from  obtaining  effective 
compliance with their environmental policy, despite increasing incomes. The negative impact 
of corruption on the stringency of environmental policy that is found here confirms the results 
of  other  authors  (Damania,  Fredriksson  and  List  [2003],  Damania,  Fredriksson  and  Mani 
[2004], Welsch [2003]).  
Furthermore, and in line with the theoretical model, our results display the combined 
effect of corruption and political instability on the stringency of environmental policy. In a 
similar  manner  to  Fredriksson  and  Svensson  [2003],  we  find  that  corruption  significantly 
reduces the stringency of the policy, but that this effect is reduced as the political instability 
increases.  At  the  same  time,  political  instability  reduces  the  stringency  of  environmental 
policy,  but  for  low  corruption  levels.  This  empirical  result  is  the  same  for  transition  and 
emerging economies, but it is much weaker for industrialized economies. Finally, we do not 
find any significant impact of current and past levels of emissions (variables CO2 and CO2_var 
t-1) on the stringency of environmental policy. 
                                                 
12  The  non-significant  interaction  term  for  this  group  of  countries  indicates  that  the  effect  is  no 
different from the one of the reference group, i.e., transition economies.  
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Table 1 – Tests of the theoretical model  
(reference group – transition economies)  
Estimations by 2SLS 
(1)  (2) 
ln(CO2)  ln(SEP)  ln(CO2)  ln(SEP) 
ln(GDP)  0,839***    1,204***   
  (0,029)    (0,068)   
Em*GDP      -0,217***   
       (0,074)   
Ind*GDP      -0,297***   
       (0,069)   
ln(Manuf_%GDP)  0,620***    0,427***   
   (0,15)    (0,13)   
ln(Food_%Manuf)  0,488***    0,0215   
   (0,098)    (0,089)   
ln(Text_%Manuf)  0,322***    0,253***   
   (0,050)    (0,047)   
ln(Wood_%Manuf)  0,147***    0,126***   
   (0,050)    (0,043)   
ln(Paper_%Manuf)  -0,232**    -0,127   
   (0,10)    (0,087)   
ln(NonMetal_%Manuf)  0,0265    0,0232   
   (0,047)    (0,039)   
ln(Metal_%Manuf)  0,396***    0,271***   
   (0,066)    (0,057)   
ln(Chem_%Manuf)  0,375***    0,226***   
   (0,094)    (0,087)   
ln(Mach_%Manuf)  0,500***    0,144   
   (0,11)    (0,10)   
ln(Other_%Manuf)  0,0616    0,0438   
   (0,055)    (0,046)   
ln(SEP)  -4,500***    -6,489***   
   (0,22)    (0,88)   
Em*SEP      5,579***   
       (0,96)   
Ind*SEP      6,325***   
       (0,99)   
ln(CO2)    0,00152    0,00107 
     (0,0037)    (0,0040) 
ln(CO2_vart-1)    -0,0209    -0,0172 
     (0,051)    (0,049) 
ln(Incomet-1)    0,0605***    0,0623*** 
     (0,014)    (0,016) 
ln(Instab)    -0,215***    -1,132** 
     (0,065)    (0,49) 
Em*ln(Instab)        0,494 
         (0,55) 
Ind* ln(Instab)        1,017** 
         (0,49) 
ln(Corruption)    -0,0567**    -0,749*** 
     (0,027)    (0,26) 
Em*ln(Corruption)        0,322 
         (0,33) 
Ind*ln(Corruption)        0,700*** 
         (0,26) 
ln(Corruption)*ln(Instab)    0,127**    0,810** 
     (0,050)    (0,36) 
Em* ln(Corruption)* ln(Instab)        -0,269 
         (0,41) 
Ind* ln(Corruption)* ln(Instab)        -0,772** 
         (0,37) 
Em      -14,62***  -0,531 
Ind      -16,51***  -0,950*** 
Tr      3,319   
Constant    3,765***    4,627*** 
Observations  365  365  365  365 
R
2  0,9960  0,2788  0,9975  0,3481 
Legend: Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0,01  ** p<0,05  * p<0,1 
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Test statistics                                           (1)                        (2)                                                                 
             
                            Wald test, F (p-value)
a: 
- CO2  7349,59 (0,0000)                7237,85 (0,0000) 
- SEP      23,15 (0,0000)                    13,35 (0,0000) 
             Wu-Hausman test, F (p-value)
b: 
                                                  - Incomet-1  0,80856 (0,3689)                0,81820 (0,3661) 
        Hausman (LM form), F (p-value)
c: 
                                                          - CO2        0,00 (1,0000)                      0,00 (1,0000) 
                                                          - SEP        0,00 (1,0000)                      0,00 (1,0000)    
                   Hausman specification test
d: 
             2SLS versus 3SLS, chi2 (p-value)     22,67   (0,0307)               139,88   (0,0000)          
 
a- The Wald and Likelihood ratio tests give very similar conclusions : they test whether there exists an effect or not. 
In  this  case,  the  null  hypothesis  is  that  the  coefficients  of  the  explanatory  variables  equal  zero.  Given  the 
calculated F statistics, we reject the null hypothesis. 
b- This test indicates whether the variable Incomet-1 is exogenous. Since the p value exceeds 10%, we retain the null 
hypothesis, according to which the variable Incomet-1 is exogenous to the model. 
c- The  Hausman  Test  (in  the  Lagrange  Multiplier  form).  We  test  whether  the  variables  in  X  are  endogenous 
(correlated with the error term). This test confirms that the explanatory variables, apart from the two that appear 
simultaneously in the two equations (CO2 et SEP), are exogenous. 
d- The Hausman specification test shows that the estimation of our model on the total sample of 60 countries is 
consistent using the method of two stage least squares, whereas the three stage least squares method is not. 
 
We continue the empirical analysis with some robustness tests that are presented in 
Table 2. Model (3) is a replica of the base model (1) on the total sample, but with the added 
explanatory variable FREE (civil liberties representing democracy). In a similar manner to 
Fredriksson et al. [2005], we find that civil liberties and political rights have a significantly 
positive  impact  on  the  stringency  of  environmental  policy.  In  the  same  way,  this  result 
confirms the conclusions of other authors, such as Pelligrini and Gerlagh [2005] who found a 
significant  and  positive  marginal  impact  of  democracy  on  the  quality  of  environmental 
regulation. 
Model (3) shows that when democracy is taken into account, the marginal effect of 
political instability (Instab) is no longer significant, whereas the coefficients of Corruption 
and Incomet-1 increase somewhat. This change in the significance and size of the coefficients 
may be explained by the correlation between institutional variables and the level of income. In 
principle, a democratic society is necessary in order for consumers to have the possibility to 
express their preferences for environmental quality. Model (4) tests the impact of the variable 
FREE for different groups of countries. Among these three groups, only the industrialized 
economies in our sample have a significant positive effect of democracy on the stringency of 
environmental policy. 
Concerning the equation of CO2 emissions, since the three effects of growth also can 
be  induced  by  trade,  we  test  the  robustness  of  our  results  by  introducing  a  variable 
representing trade openness (the variable OPEN in Model (5)). By comparing models (3) and 
(5),  we  notice  that  the  scale  effect  increases  slightly.  Some  coefficients  representing  the 
relative share of different manufacturing sub-sectors change their size and significance. Only 
the coefficients of the industrial sub-sectors Paper Products, Iron&Steel and Basic Metal 
Products, and Machinery and Equipment, are more or less robust. Also, once trade openness 
is taken into account, the effect on industrial CO2 emissions of the share of the manufacturing 
industry  in  the  economy  decreases.  These  changes  can  be  explained  by  the  correlation 
between  trade  openness  and  growth,  countries’  economic  structure  and  their  industrial 
specialization.   
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Table 2 – Robustness tests 
Estimations by 2SLS 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
ln(CO2)  ln(SEP)  ln(CO2)  ln(SEP)  ln(CO2)  ln(SEP)  ln(CO2)  ln(SEP) 
ln(GDP)  0,886***    0,873***    0,928***    1,010***   
   (0,030)    (0,029)    (0,038)    (0,039)   
ln(Manuf_%GDP)  0,509***    0,354**    0,388**    0,292*   
   (0,17)    (0,17)    (0,15)    (0,15)   
ln(Food_%Manuf)  0,413***    0,335***    0,241**    0,189**   
   (0,099)    (0,095)    (0,095)    (0,093)   
ln(Text_%Manuf)  0,315***    0,300***    0,193***    0,137***   
   (0,057)    (0,055)    (0,051)    (0,047)   
ln(Wood_%Manuf)  0,142**    0,144***    0,0259    0,0157   
   (0,056)    (0,054)    (0,054)    (0,046)   
ln(Paper_%Manuf)  -0,348***    -0,432***    -0,330***    -0,198**   
   (0,11)    (0,11)    (0,10)    (0,090)   
ln(NonMetal_%Manuf)  -0,0136    -0,0330    -0,0293    -0,0603*   
   (0,047)    (0,045)    (0,042)    (0,033)   
ln(Metal_%Manuf)  0,292***    0,279***    0,254***    0,314***   
   (0,079)    (0,077)    (0,068)    (0,058)   
ln(Chem_%Manuf)  0,299***    0,268***    0,0613    0,0351   
   (0,096)    (0,093)    (0,088)    (0,070)   
ln(Mach_%Manuf)  0,410***    0,383***    0,416***    0,159*   
   (0,12)    (0,12)    (0,10)    (0,096)   
ln(Other_%Manuf)  0,0839    0,0743    0,0933*    0,0288   
   (0,060)    (0,058)    (0,052)    (0,044)   
ln(SEP)  -4,415***    -4,065***    -4,203***    -2,354***   
   (0,24)    (0,22)    (0,27)    (0,54)   
ln(CO2)    -0,00282    -0,00217    0,00363    0,00174 
     (0,0036)    (0,0041)    (0,0045)    (0,0048) 
ln(CO2_vart-1)    0,00326    0,0132    -0,0162    -0,0284 
     (0,053)    (0,051)    (0,055)    (0,053) 
ln(Incomet-1)    0,0764***    0,118***    0,0750***    0,117*** 
     (0,014)    (0,016)    (0,015)    (0,017) 
ln(Instab)    -0,0362    -0,0470    -0,0372    -0,0652 
     (0,071)    (0,069)    (0,071)    (0,069) 
ln(Corruption)    -0,0781***    -0,114***    -0,0751***    -0,139*** 
     (0,028)    (0,029)    (0,028)    (0,030) 
ln(Corruption)*ln(Instab)    0,114**    0,103**    0,0935*    0,141*** 
     (0,051)    (0,049)    (0,051)    (0,050) 
FREE    0,0682***    0,0128    0,0461**    0,0587*** 
     (0,017)    (0,039)    (0,019)    (0,020) 
Em*FREE        0,0572         
         (0,042)         
Ind*FREE        0,144***         
         (0,050)         
ln(OPEN)          -2,009***  -0,131*  3,188*  -0,0260 
           (0,37)  (0,071)  (1,66)  (0,15) 
Em* ln(OPEN)              -3,603***  -0,222 
               (0,93)  (0,19) 
Ind* ln(OPEN)              -4,587**  -0,232 
               (2,25)  (0,29) 
ln(OPEN)*ln(KL)          0,219***    -0,355*   
           (0,038)    (0,19)   
Em* ln(OPEN)*ln(KL)              0,0462***   
               (0,012)   
Ind* ln(OPEN)*ln(KL)              0,508**   
               (0,23)   
ln(OPEN)*ln(Incomet-1)            0,0169**    0,0119 
             (0,0075)    (0,017) 
Em* ln(OPEN) *ln(Incomet-1)                0,0192 
                 (0,021) 
Ind* ln(OPEN) *ln(Incomet-1)                0,0137 
                 (0,029) 
Em        -0,00224      -8,434***  0,0345 
Ind        -0,238***      -9,046***  -0,107*** 
Tr              -8,253***   
Constant    3,384***    3,068***    3,470***    3,210*** 
Observations  329  329  329  329  317  317  317  317 
R
2   0,9962  0,3335  0,9964  0,3990  0,9972  0,3518  0,9984  0,4179 
Legend: Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0,01  ** p<0,05  * p<0,1  
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Moreover,  the  technique  effect,  represented  by  the  marginal  impact  of  the  stringency  of 
environmental policy, is decreased. One may conclude that its effect is not always direct and 
represented by a technical response to policy stringency, but can be complemented by the 
effect  of  trade  openness  and  the  need  for  compliance  with  technical  and  international 
environmental standards.  
Model (6) shows that the direct effect of trade openness is to reduce industrial CO2 
emissions of emerging and industrialized economies. In industrialized economies, this effect 
decreases as countries become more capital-abundant, whereas the negative effect of trade 
openness on emissions increases with capital accumulation for emerging economies. Opposite 
results are found for the countries in transition. Trade openness directly increases industrial 
CO2 emissions of the transition economies in our sample, but the effect decreases with capital 
accumulation. One could explain this result by the specific development of the economies in 
transition, that were strongly and irrationally industrialized during the communist period. In 
fact, trade openness would have stimulated the production of sectors in which these countries 
had comparative advantages, i.e., rather polluting sectors. Based on Antweiler, Copeland and 
Taylor’s  [2001]  analysis  and  our  empirical  results,  we  can  conclude  that  trade  openness 
increases pollution in the countries that export goods whose production is pollution intensive. 
If the direct effect of trade openness is to increase industrial CO2 emissions of the economies 
in transition, then the indirect one that interacts with the accumulation of physical capital 
reduces  this  effect.  Economic  openness  (trade,  FDI)  would  have  contributed  to  the 
replacement of old capital (strongly polluting installations and equipment) by more modern 
technologies. 
Finally, trade openness has also a direct impact on the stringency of environmental 
policy. Model (5) on the total sample shows that trade openness reduces the stringency of 
environmental policy ("race to the bottom" phenomenon
13), but that this effect is attenuated as 
the net per capita income increases, and society’s willingness to pay for environmental quality 
increases. Model (6) does not enable us to distinguish separate effects of trade openness on 
the stringency of environmental policy for the different groups of countries, so future research 
that specifically analyses the impact of trade openness is needed. 
We finish the empirical analysis by estimating the base model on the reduced sample 
of transition economies only (Table 3). Given the Hausman test statistic (18.58) we discuss 
the results estimated by three stage least squares that are consistent and efficient. Starting with 
the  composition  effect,  the  share  of  the  manufacturing  sector  in  the  economy  was  not  a 
significant determinant of industrial CO2 emissions in the transition economies in our sample 
over the period 1995-2003. Since the manufacturing sector experienced a sharp drop in the 
first phase of transition (1990-1995), it could however have been the determining factor in 
explaining the fall in CO2 emissions during those years. 
As  for  the  structure  of  the  manufacturing  industry  itself,  the  marginal  effects  of 
changes in the shares of the Paper Products and Chemical sectors are not significant. The 
relative share of the Wood Products sector has reduced CO2 emissions, though, whereas the 
marginal effect of changes in the relative shares of all the other sectors has increased CO2 
emissions. 
 
                                                 
13 The "race to the bottom" assumption is used as an argument to fear that international trade and 
investment put pressure on the environmental standards of countries and thus damage the environment. 
For some, the expression "race to the bottom" suggests that the result will be a world of little or without 
environmental regulation. In general, the concern is that, insofar as countries are open to international 




Table 3 – Transition countries only 
  
2SLS  3SLS 
ln(CO2)  ln(SEP)  ln(CO2)  ln(SEP) 
ln(GDP)  1,043***     1,034***    
   (0,078)     (0,061)    
ln(Manuf_%GDP)  -0,183     0,162    
   (0,32)     (0,24)    
ln(Food_%Manuf)  0,400*     0,411**    
   (0,23)     (0,18)    
ln(Text_%Manuf)  0,124     0,213***    
   (0,10)     (0,078)    
ln(Wood_%Manuf)  -0,189     -0,168*    
   (0,12)     (0,092)    
ln(Paper_%Manuf)  0,0699     0,0344    
   (0,18)     (0,14)    
ln(NonMetal_%Manuf)  0,543***     0,396**    
   (0,21)     (0,15)    
ln(Metal_%Manuf)  0,222     0,398***    
   (0,18)     (0,14)    
ln(Chem_%Manuf)  0,0546     0,141    
   (0,13)     (0,094)    
ln(Mach_%Manuf)  1,204***     0,912***    
   (0,21)     (0,15)    
ln(Other_%Manuf)  0,437***     0,303***    
   (0,14)     (0,10)    
ln(SEP)  -5,455***     -5,547***    
   (0,50)     (0,41)    
ln(CO2)     -0,000263     0,00122 
      (0,0084)     (0,0078) 
ln(CO2_vart-1)     0,00847     -0,0212 
      (0,072)     (0,055) 
ln(Incomet-1)     0,0945**     0,114*** 
      (0,039)     (0,033) 
ln(Instab)     -1,122**     -1,248*** 
      (0,46)     (0,39) 
ln(Corruption)     -0,723***     -1,012*** 
      (0,25)     (0,21) 
ln(Corruption)*ln(Instab)     0,833**     1,063*** 
      (0,34)     (0,29) 
Constant     4,175***     4,323*** 
      (0,59)     (0,48) 
Observations  82  82  82  82 
R
2  0,9976  0,5606  0,9973  0,5315 
2SLS vs 3SLS (Hausman chi2 and p-value)  18,58 (0,0992) 
 
To conclude the test of the basic model on the sample of transition economies, we find 
empirical results similar to those of Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor [2001]: significant scale, 
composition  and  technique  effects,  the  last  being  represented  by  a  responsiveness  to  the 
stringency of environmental policy, and having the most important marginal impact. As to the 
total impact on CO2 emissions, the scale and the composition effects have both increased 
industrial  CO2  emissions,  whereas  the  technique  effect  has  reduced  them  and  actually 
compensated for the first two effects, bringing  about an 18% reduction in industrial CO2 
emissions over the period 1995-2003. Table 4 shows the results for each effect. Using the 
change in GDP in transition countries between 1995 and 2003 (+30%), and of all the sub-
sectors  for  which  we  found  a  statically  significant  effect  in  the  three  stage  least  squares 
regression  on  transition  economies,  and  multiplying  them  by  their  marginal  effects  (the  
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elasticity coefficients from Table 3), we estimate that the scale effect and the composition 
effect have increased CO2 emissions by 31% and by 8.4% respectively. By multiplying the 
change in the SEP index (+10.5%) with the estimated marginal effect of an increase in the 
stringency of environmental policy, we find that the technique effect reduced industrial CO2 
emissions by 58%. 
Table 4 – Estimation of the scale, composition and technique effects for 
transition economies, variation in CO2 emissions in 2003 compared to 1995. 
 
X  dCO2/dX  P>z 
∆ 2003 vs 1995, % 
[C.I. of ∆CO2, 95%] 
X  CO2  
ln(GDP)  1,0337  0,0000  30,04  31,05  27,46  34,65 
Ln(Manuf_%GDP)  0,1619  0,5000  -11,38  -1,84  -7,19  3,51 
ln(Food_%Manuf)  0,4108  0,0240  15,84  6,51  0,88  12,14 
ln(Text_%Manuf)  0,2133  0,0060  36,71  7,83  2,20  13,46 
ln(Wood_%Manuf)  -0,1683  0,0670  33,89  -5,7  -11,81  0,41 
ln(Paper_%Manuf)  0,0344  0,8020  -0,99  -0,03  -0,30  0,23 
ln(NonMetal_%Manuf)  0,3957  0,0110  34,22  13,54  3,16  23,92 
ln(Metal_%Manuf)  0,3985  0,0040  -6,18  -2,46  -4,16  -0,77 
ln(Chem_%Manuf)  0,1407  0,1330  -33,65  -4,73   -10,92   1,45 
ln(Mach_%Manuf)  0,9121  0,0000  -20,35  -18,56  -24,74  -12,38 
ln(Other_%Manuf)  0,3031  0,0040  24,06  7,29  2,35  12,24 
ln(SEP)  -5,5469  0,0000  10,47  -58,1  -66,51  -49,64 
Note : The estimates of variables (X) in bold are significant at a 5% level, except Wood_%Manuf – at 6.7%. 
 
Overall,  the  total  reduction  of  18%  of  industrial  CO2  emissions  is  considerable. 
Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that there is yet more potential for pollution reduction by 
means  of  a  technique  effect  induced  by  increased  stringency  of  environmental  policy.  In 
particular, our econometric analysis shows a significant impact of institutional quality on the 
stringency of environmental policy, and thus on pollution. If there were convergence in the 
indicators measuring corruption and political instability in transition economies towards the 
level  of  the  same  indicators  for  industrialized  economies,  further  improvement  of 
environmental quality could be achieved in the transition economies studied here. In 2003, the 
industrialized economies in our sample had an average score of 1.3 for corruption and of 1.98 
for political instability. In the transition economies in our sample, the equivalent indicators 
were 3.01 and 2.66
14, respectively. Convergence towards the same level of the indicators for 
industrialized economies implies a reduction by 57% in the corruption indicator and by 26% 
in the indicator for political instability. This reduction in corruption alone would bring about 
an improvement of 57% of the SEP index, all else equal (in particular, an unchanged level of 
political  instability).  This  would  translate  into  a  considerable  reduction  of  industrial  CO2 
emissions.  If,  all  else  equal,  the  level  of  political  instability  was  reduced  to  the  level  of 
industrialized economies, there would be an increase of 32% in the SEP index. If the two 
indicators – corruption and political instability – converged simultanously towards the level of 
the industrialized economies in our sample, the stringency of environmental policy would 
increase  further,  yielding  a  considerable  improvement  in  environmental  quality  of  the 
transition economies. 
                                                 
14 These values represent the inverse of the original Kaufmann indicators, with a transformation of 
negative values into positive values: a low value thus indicates a low level of corruption and a high 
value a higher level of corruption.  
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Conclusion 
The objective of the article was to test if the environmental performance observed in 
the  countries  in  transition  between  1995  and  2003  was  the  result  of  the  change  in  the 
economic and industrial structure or rather determined by an improvement in the stringency of 
environmental policy. We developed a theoretical model specifying the demand for pollution 
and the creation of the environmental policy (supply of pollution) at the same time and we 
tested this model on the determining factors of industrial CO2 emissions in the countries in 
transition  compared  to  the  groups  of  emerging  and  industrialized  economies.  Our  results 
confirm the existence of a scale effect, a disaggregated composition effect, and a technique 
effect, the last having had the largest marginal impact on industrial CO2 emissions.  
The scale effect is greater in the transition economies (compared to the industrialized 
economies where it had less of an effect). As for the composition effect, the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the economy  was not  a significant determinant of industrial CO2 
emissions  in  the  countries  in  transition  between  1995  and  2003.  In  terms  of  industrial 
structure, the composition effect has had a significant impact on industrial pollution in the 
economies  in  transition.  We  can  conclude  that  the  environmental  performance  in  these 
countries can be explained partly by changes in their industrial structure: increases in the 
relative  weights  of  more  pollution-intensive  sub-sectors  and  reduced  shares  of  the  less 
pollution-intensive sectors. 
The technique effect is represented in our study by the reactivity of producers to a 
change in the stringency of environmental policy that usually occurs through a modernization 
of production technology. This effect is significantly negative and greater than both the scale 
and the composition effects. Nevertheless, when the effect of trade openness is taken into 
account, the marginal impact of the stringency of environmental policy decreases. One could 
conclude that the technique effect is due also to trade openness and the need for complying 
with international technical and environmental standards. At the same time, the direct effect 
of increased trade openness is to reduce industrial CO2 emissions, but the impact decreases 
when an economy becomes more capital-intensive. This result is valid for the industrialized 
economies in our sample, and to a lesser extent for the emerging economies. In the case of the 
transition economies, the impact of trade openness is to increase industrial CO2 emissions, but 
this  effect  is  attenuated  with  capital  accumulation.  Their  very  industrialized  economic 
structure  and  the  comparative  advantage  in  the  (strongly  polluting)  production  of  capital-
intensive goods at the beginning of the transition, could explain this result. It is only with the 
accumulation  of  more  modern  capital  that  these  countries  have  been  able  to  improve 
production technology and become more effective in terms of pollution abatement. 
As  for  the  stringency  of  environmental  policy  itself,  it  is  determined  by  the 
institutional quality of the country and consumer preferences for environmental quality. The 
impact of political instability and corruption is negative, as predicted by the theoretical model; 
their effect on the stringency of environmental policy is very strong for the economies in 
transition, whereas it is weak for the industrialized countries in our sample. We also find an 
interdependent effect of corruption and political instability on the stringency of environmental 
policy. Finally, following tests of robustness, we note that the stringency of environmental 
policy is also determined by two other variables: democracy and trade openness. The first is 
strongly  correlated  with  the  institutional  quality  of  the  country  and  has  a  significant  and 
positive impact on the stringency of the policy. As for trade openness, our results on the total 
sample indicate that trade openness reduced the stringency of the environmental policy, but 
that this effect was attenuated with higher net income per capita. These results confirm the 
"race to the bottom" hypothesis, the effect of which is mitigated once consumers become 
richer and more concerned with environmental quality.   
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To conclude, the environmental performance in terms of industrial CO2 emissions of 
the countries in transition recorded between 1995 and 2003 can be explained by the following 
factors: a modernization of production technology induced mainly by increased stringency of 
the environmental policy (contributing to a 58% reduction in industrial CO2 emissions), and 
that  compensated  the  increase  in  emissions  due  to  the  scale  effect  (+31%)  and  the 
composition  effect  in  terms  of  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  manufacturing  industry  in 
favour of more pollution-intensive sectors (+8.4%). The technique effect thus permitted an 
overall net reduction of 18% of industrial CO2 emissions in 2003 compared to 1995. Finally, 
the  analysis  concluded  that  further  emission  reductions  may  be  obtained  in  transition 
economies through convergence of the quality of institutional governance indicators, such as 
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15: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 





16: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  South  Africa,  South  Korea, 




17:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Cyprus,  Denmark, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hong  Kong,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Japan, 
Luxembourg,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Singapore,  Spain,  Sweden, 














                                                 
15  Previously  planned  economies  that  have  embarked  upon  a transition  process  towards  a  market 
economy. 
16 We define emerging economies according to the Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Index, 2006. 
They are countries for which the GDP per capita is lower than that of developed countries, but that go 
through rapid economic growth, and for which living standards converge towards those in developed 
countries, and that are characterized by a growing share of world commerce. 
17 According to the 1997 edition of World Economic Outlook (IMF), a certain number of newly 
industrialized countries in Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore), and Israel, are categorized in the group 
traditionally known as industrialized countries. These countries, as well as Cyprus and Malta, are 
among the top 30 countries in terms of standard of living (Economist Intelligence Unit’s quality of life 





Table 1 – Variable definitions and sources 
 
Name  Definition  Source 
CO2  Industrial carbon dioxide emissions, in kT  International Energy Agency 
GDP  GDP in constant 2000 US$  World Development Indicators 2005, World 
Bank 
Manuf_%GDP 
Share of the manufacturing sector’s value added (VA) in the 
GDP 
INDSTAT4 (REV3) database of the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) 
Food_%Manuf 
Share of the Food sub-sector’s VA in the total manufacturing 
sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
Text_%Manuf 
Share of the Textiles sub-sector’s VA in the total manufacturing 
sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
Wood_%Manuf 
Share of the Wood products sub-sector’s VA in the total 
manufacturing sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
Paper_%Manuf 
Share of the Paper products sub-sector’s VA in the total 
manufacturing sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
NonMetal_%Manuf 
Share of the Non-Metallic mineral products sub-sector’s VA in 
the total manufacturing sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
Metal_%Manuf 
Share of the Iron & steel and basic metal products sub-sector’s 
VA in the total manufacturing sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
Chem_%Manuf 
Share of the Chemicals sub-sector’s VA in the total 
manufacturing sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
Mach_%Manuf 
Share of the Machinery & equipment sub-sector’s VA in the 
total manufacturing sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
Other_%Manuf 
Share of the Other manufacturing products sub-sector’s VA in 
the total manufacturing sector’s VA  UNIDO INDSTAT4 (REV3) database 
SEP 
Stringency of Environmental Policy Index  Calculated by the authors 
MEA – number of signed multilateral environmental agreements  World Trade Organization 
ECOLEX – takes value 1 if the country has air pollution legislation and 
0 otherwise.  United Nations Environment Program 
NGO – the number of members of international non-governmental 
organizations per million inhabitants 
Center for the Study of Global Governance. 2004. 
Global Civil Society 2004/5 
ISO14001- the number of ISO 14001 certified firms weighted by GDP  ISO – International Organization for Standardization 
Responsible Care® membership (see explanations in section 4)  Responsible Care® The chemical industry’s global 
voluntary initiative 
Incomet-1 
Net income per capita lagged by one year, international current 
dollars in PPP  
World Development Indicators 2005, World 
Bank 
OPEN 
Trade openness. Calculated by the basic method used in 
international statistics : (Exports+Imports)/GDP 
World Development Indicators 2005, World 
Bank 
Instab  Index for political instability (see explanations in section 4)  Kaufmann et al. [2005] 
Corruption  Index for corruption (see explanations in section 4)  Kaufmann et al. [2005] 
FREE 
A  dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country is 
considered democratic and 0 otherwise. In fact, it takes value 1 
if the average of the two variables of Freedom House : 
« Political Rights » and « Civil Liberties » lies between 1.0 and 
2.5 (which indicates a high level of freedom). 
Freedom House 
OPEN*KL 
Interaction term between trade openness and the Capital stock 
to Labour ratio. The capital stock is calculated by using the 
following formula: Creation of fixed assetst +0.95*Capital 
stockt-1. Because of data availability, the fixed assets created in 
1989 are taken as a basic capital stock. 
World Development Indicators 2005, World 
Bank 
OPEN *Incomet-1 
Interaction term between trade openness and the net per capita 
income 
World Development Indicators 2005, World 
Bank 
Corruption*Instab  Interaction term between corruption and political instability  Kaufmann et al. [2005] 
Tr, Em and Ind 
Dummy variables for transition economies, emerging 
economies and industrialized economies, respectively  Constructed by the authors 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max. 
CO2  533  63900,86  156913,6  15  1266205 
GDP  540  4,75E+11  1,33E+12  1260000000  1,03E+13 
Manuf_%GDP  456  19,75191  5,743874  4,548165  39,34211 
Food_%Manuf  428  19,04128  9,856324  2,97583  64,52444 
Text_%Manuf  428  7,749555  5,759608  0,1061753  36,48632 
Wood_%Manuf  428  2,884719  2,780549  0,1630973  17,79805 
Paper_%Manuf  428  9,479729  5,047287  1,942741  33,62775 
NonMetal_%Manuf  428  5,590139  3,373295  0,0177442  19,53495 
Metal_%Manuf  428  10,9699  4,998871  0,7675812  30,59557 
Chem_%Manuf  540  18,04802  8,954029  2,10706  62,09823 
Mach_%Manuf  428  23,47831  10,6087  2,075568  53,69643 
Other_%Manuf  428  2,787934  1,738049  0,0606678  9,722948 
OPEN  504  0,8409266  0,5443998  0,171077  3,255867 
Incomet-1  540  15174,49  10513,65  1270,449  57846,66 
Corruption  540  2,262923  1,065265  0,4170122  4,154919 
Instab  540  2,502241  0,8626573  1,242691  4,947204 
FREE  477  0,7148847  0,4519433  0  1 
SEP  540  61,52841  7,683734  37,75274  98,0698 
MEA  540  15,13704  3,787946  0  23 
ECOLEX  540  0,8981481  0,3027338  0  1 
NGO  540  474,2888  1014,68  0  6353,3 
ISO14001/GDP(Mrd)  540  58,48929  1334,457  0  31011,02 










Table 3 – Partial correlations (significance / p-values in italic) 



















Manuf  SEP  OPEN  Incomet-1  Corruption  Instab  FREE 
CO2  1.0000                                     
GDP  0.5773  1.0000                                   
   0.0000                                                    
Manuf_%GDP  0.3169  0.0266  1.0000                                 
   0.0000  0.5715                                                 
Food_%Manuf  -0.1637  -0.1633  -0.2462  1.0000                               
   0.0007  0.0007  0.0000                                              
Text_%Manuf  0.0111  -0.1769  -0.2590  0.1019  1.0000                             
   0.8206  0.0002  0.0000  0.0350                                           
Wood_%Manuf  -0.1483  -0.1173  0.0370  0.1035  0.0220  1.0000                           
   0.0023  0.0151  0.4806  0.0323  0.6500                                        
Paper_%Manuf  -0.1940  0.0339  -0.2085  -0.2882  -0.2688  0.1905  1.0000                         
   0.0001  0.4840  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001                                     
NonMetal_%Manuf  -0.0630  -0.1432  -0.1959  0.3259  0.3070  -0.0567  -0.2896   1.0000                       
   0.1970  0.0030  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.2416  0.0000                                  
Metal_%Manuf  0.0621  0.0874  -0.0239  -0.3397  -0.2673  0.0383  0.0358   -0.0142  1.0000                     
   0.2032  0.0708  0.6495  0.0000  0.0000  0.4290  0.4603  0.7690                               
Chem_%Manuf  0.0812  0.0243  0.0929  -0.1309  -0.1909  -0.4240  -0.3394   -0.1399  -0.1222  1.0000                   
   0.0611  0.5732  0.0473  0.0067  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0037  0.0114                            
Mach_%Manuf  0.2134  0.2447  0.4063  -0.6888  -0.3302  -0.1597  0.2013   -0.5182  0.0440  -0.1255  1.0000                 
   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0009  0.0000  0.0000  0.3638  0.0094                         
Other_%Manuf  -0.0822  0.0015  -0.0922  -0.1361  0.0648  0.2528  0.1798   -0.0057  0.1202  -0.4519  0.0881  1.0000               
   0.0920  0.9750  0.0786  0.0048  0.1812  0.0000  0.0002  0.9070  0.0129  0.0000  0.0688                      
SEP  -0.1728  0.0478  0.0685  -0.2109  -0.2459  0.1660  0.3932   -0.1972  0.0953  -0.1504  0.1867  0.1926  1.0000             
   0.0001  0.2670  0.1444  0.0000  0.0000  0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  0.0488  0.0005  0.0001  0.0001                   
OPEN  -0.2690  -0.2679  0.0352  -0.1682  0.1719  0.1112  0.1220   -0.0366  -0.1865  -0.0728  0.0921  0.1082  0.1798  1.0000           
   0.0000  0.0000  0.4589  0.0007  0.0006  0.0263  0.0147  0.4654  0.0002  0.1024  0.0662  0.0307  0.0000                
Incomet-1  -0.0120  0.3150  -0.1132  -0.4788  -0.3817  -0.0040  0.5660   -0.3941  0.2941  -0.0705  0.4049  0.2215  0.5335  0.2753   1.0000         
   0.7824  0.0000  0.0156  0.0000  0.0000  0.9350  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1015  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000             
Corruption  0.0594  -0.2003  0.0154  0.4853  0.4461  -0.0488  -0.6730   0.3738  -0.1979  0.1158  -0.4427  -0.1520  -0.5497  -0.1953   -0.8633  1.0000       
   0.1710  0.0000  0.7432  0.0000  0.0000  0.3135  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0070  0.0000  0.0016  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000          
Instab  0.0629  -0.1319  -0.1275  0.3936  0.3546  -0.1981  -0.5474   0.2614  -0.1893  0.2341  -0.3688  -0.2681  -0.5593  -0.3191   -0.7253  0.8081  1.0000     
   0.1469  0.0021  0.0064  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000       
FREE  -0.1097  0.1498  -0.0439  -0.2329  -0.2917  0.2036  0.3916   -0.3481  0.4181  -0.1313  0.1674  0.4008  0.4880  0.1293   0.5789  -0.5508  -0.6570  1.0000  
  0.0173  0.0010  0.3742  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0041  0.0011  0.0000  0.0000  0.0060  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000    
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